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This report is published as a NICPRE research bulletin. 
The mission of NICPRE is to enhance the overall 
understanding of economic and policy issues associated 
with commodity promotion programs. An 
understanding of these issues is crucial to ensuring 
continued authorization for domestic checkoff programs 
and to fund export promotion programs.
The intent of this bulletin is to provide an updated, 
independent evaluation of the National Dairy Promotion 
and Research Board. This report should help farmers, 
policy makers, and program managers in understanding 
the economic impacts of generic dairy advertising on 
the national markets for milk and dairy products. The 
report should also be useful for current legal debates on 
the effectiveness of commodity promotion programs in 
enhancing the profitability of farmers.
Executive Summary
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impacts of 
generic dairy advertising by the National Dairy 
Promotion and Research Board on retail, wholesale, and 
farm dairy markets. A disaggregated industry model of 
the retail, wholesale, and farm levels with markets for 
fluid milk, frozen products, cheese, and butter was 
developed to conduct the analysis. An econometric 
model of the dairy industry was estimated using 
quarterly data from 1975 through 1995. The 
econometric results were then used to simulate market 
conditions with and without the NDPRB.
The results indicate that NDPRB had a major impact on 
market conditions at all levels of the dairy industry. For
• An increase in the national farm milk price of 
1.93 percent and an increase in milk 
production of 0.4 percent.
• An increase in dairy producer revenue of 2.34 
percent.
• A rate of return of 3.40, i.e„ an additional 
dollar invested in generic advertising resulted 
in a return of $3.40 in dairy producer revenue.
• An increase in overall demand for milk of 0.51 
percent, including a 0.91 percent increase in 
fluid milk demand, and a 0.48 percent increase 
in cheese demand. The NDPRB had virtually 
no impact on butter and frozen product 
demand.
• An overall increase in retail prices for milk and 
dairy products. The national advertising 
program had the largest effect on increasing 
retail fluid milk prices (5.62 percent). Retail 
frozen product, cheese, and butter prices 
increased by 0.73 percent, 0.81 percent, and 
0.10 percent, respectively, due to NDPRB 
advertising efforts.
• An increase in all wholesale prices for milk 
and dairy products. The national advertising 
program had the largest effect on increasing 
wholesale fluid milk prices (4.10 percent). 
Wholesale frozen product, cheese, and butter 
prices increased by 1.07 percent, 2.75 percent, 
and 0.27 percent, respectively, due the NDPRB 
advertising effort.
• A decrease in government purchases of dairy 
products under the Dairy Price Support 
Program. The results indicated that there was a 
12.00 percent decrease in cheese purchases, a 
1.59 percent decrease in butter purchases, and 
a 2.01 percent increase in total dairy product 
purchases by the government due to the 
NDPRB.
In order to measure more recent impacts of the 
national advertising program, the average quarterly 
results for the most recent year were computed. From 
the fourth quarter of 1994 through the third quarter of 
1995, on average, the NDPRB had the following market
impacts compared to what would have occurred in the 
absence of this national program:
• An increase in the national farm milk price of
2.93 percent and an increase in milk 
production of 0.62 percent.
• An increase in dairy producer revenue of 3.52 
percent.
• A rate of return of 6.43, i.e., an additional 
dollar invested in generic advertising resulted 
in a return of $6.43 in dairy producer revenue.
• An increase in overall demand for milk of 0.70 
percent, including a 1.72 percent increase in 
fluid milk demand, and a 0.27 percent increase 
in cheese demand. The NDPRB had virtually 
no impact on butter and frozen product 
demand.
• An overall increase in retail prices for milk and 
dairy products. The national advertising 
program had the largest effect on increasing 
retail fluid milk prices (10.11 percent). Retail 
frozen product, cheese, and butter prices 
increased by 1.10 percent, 0.49 percent, and 
0.39 percent, respectively, due to NDPRB 
advertising efforts.
• An increase in all wholesale prices for milk 
and dairy products. The national advertising 
program had the largest effect on increasing 
wholesale fluid milk prices (6.74 percent). 
Wholesale frozen product, cheese, and butter 
prices increased by 1.62 percent, 1.78 percent, 
and 1.12 percent, respectively, due to NDPRB 
advertising efforts.
• A decrease in government purchases of dairy 
products under the Dairy Price Support 
Program. The results indicated no change in 
cheese purchases, a 2.25 percent decrease in 
butter purchases, and a 2.25 percent increase in 
total dairy product purchases by the 
government due to the NDPRB.
Consequently, it is clear that dairy farmers benefited 
from the presence of the NDPRB since farm prices and 
producer revenues were positively impacted. Dairy 
wholesalers and retailers also benefited from this 
program since prices and sales were positively effected 
by the NDPRB advertising effort. Tax payers also 
benefited because government purchases and costs of 
the Dairy Price Support Program were lower. The
results also suggest that the net benefits of the NDPRB 
to farmers have become larger in recent years.
Introduction
Dairy farmers pay a mandatory assessment of 15 cents 
per hundred pounds of milk marketed in the continental 
United States to fund a national demand expansion 
program. The aim of this program is to increase 
consumer demand for milk and dairy products, enhance 
dairy farm revenue, and reduce the amount of surplus 
milk purchased by the government under the Dairy 
Price Support Program. Legislative authority for these 
assessments, which exceed $200 million annually, is 
contained in the Dairy’ and Tobacco Adjustment Act of 
1983. To increase milk and dairy product consumption, 
the National Dairy Promotion and Research Board 
(NDPRB) was established to invest in generic dairy 
advertising and promotion, nutrition research, 
education, and new product development.
The purpose of this study is to estimate the 
impacts of the NDPRB generic advertising effort on the 
U.S. dairy industry. In this study, a previous model by 
Kaiser (1995) was revised and updated to measure the 
market impacts of generic milk and dairy product 
advertising. The model used is based on a dynamic 
econometric model of the U.S. dairy industry estimated 
using quarterly data from 1975 through 1995 and is 
unique from previous models of the U.S. dairy sector in 
its level of disaggregation. For instance, the dairy 
industry is divided into retail, wholesale, and farm 
markets, and the retail and wholesale markets separately 
include fluid milk, cheese, butter, and frozen products. 
Econometric results are used to simulate market 
conditions with and without the national program.
The results of this study are important for dairy 
farmers and policy makers given that the dairy industry 
has the largest generic promotion program of all U.S. 
agricultural commodities. Moreover, since the 
constitutionality of some commodity promotion 
organizations (including dairy) are currently being 
challenged in court, measurements of the economic 
impacts of generic advertising is particularly important 
at this time. Hence, a secondary objective of this study 
is to provide information that will help in future legal 
debates concerning commodity promotion programs.
The Conceptual Model
The econometric model presented here is similar in 
structure to the Liu et al. (1990, 1991) industry model, 
with one importance difference. While Liu et al. (1990, 
1991) classified all manufactured products into one 
category (Class III), the present model disaggregates
manufactured products into three classes: frozen
products, cheese, and butter. This greater degree of 
product disaggregation provides for additional insight 
into the impacts of advertising on individual product 
demand, e.g., cheese demand.
In the farm market, Grade A (fluid eligible) 
milk is produced by farmers and sold to wholesalers. 
The wholesale market is disaggregated into four sub­
markets: fluid (beverage) milk, frozen products, cheese,
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and butter. Wholesalers process the milk into these 
four dairy products and sell them to retailers, who then 
sell the products to consumers.
It is assumed that the two major federal
programs that regulate the dairy industry (Federal milk
marketing orders and the Dairy Price Support Program)
are in effect. Since this is a national model, it is
assumed that there is one Federal milk marketing order
regulating all milk marketed in the nation. The Federal
milk marketing order program is incorporated by
restricting the prices wholesalers pay for raw milk to be
the minimum class prices. For example, fluid milk
wholesalers pay the higher Class I price, while cheese
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wholesalers pay the lower Class III price. The Dairy 
Price Support Program is incorporated into the model 
by restricting the wholesale cheese and butter prices to 
be greater than or equal to the government purchase 
prices for these products. With the government offering 
to buy unlimited quantities of storable manufactured 
dairy products at announced purchase prices, the 
program indirectly supports the farm milk price by 
increasing farm-level milk demand. A conceptual 
overview of the model is presented in Figure 1.
Retail markets are defined by sets of supply 
and demand functions, in addition to equilibrium 
conditions that require supply and demand to be equal. 
Since the market is disaggregated into fluid milk, frozen 
products, cheese, and butter, there are four sets of these 
equations with each set having the following general 
specification:
 ^All quantities in the model are expressed on a milkfat equivalent 
basis. Consequently, nonfat dry milk was not considered in the 
model.
^Most federal milk marketing orders utilize four product classes with 
Class I being fluid products, Class II being soft dairy products, Class 
III being mostly hard dairy products, and Class Ilia being nonfat dry 
milk. A two-class system was used in this study, with all fluid 
products considered Class I and all manufactured products 
considered Class II.
(1.2) Qrs = f(PrISrs),
(1.3) Qrs = Qrd = Qr,
where: Qrd and Qrs are retail demand and supply, 
respectively, Pr is the retail own price, Srd is a vector of 
retail demand shifters including generic advertising, Srs 
is a vector of retail supply shifters including the 
wholesale own price, and Qr is the equilibrium retail 
quantity.
The wholesale market is also defined by four 
sets of supply and demand functions, and equilibrium 
conditions. The wholesale fluid milk and frozen 
product markets have the following general 
specification:
(2.1) Qwd = Qr,
(2.2) Qws = f(PwISws),
(2.3) Qws = Qwd = Qw = Qr,
where: Qwd and Qws are wholesale demand and
supply, respectively, Pw is the wholesale own price, and 
Sws is a vector of wholesale supply shifters. In the 
wholesale fluid milk supply equation, Sws includes the 
Class I price, which is equal to the Class III milk price 
(i.e., the Minnesota-Wisconsin price) plus a fixed fluid 
milk differential. In the frozen products, cheese, and
butter wholesale supply functions, Sws includes the 
Class III price, which is the most important variable 
cost to dairy processors. Note that the wholesale level 
demand functions do not have to be estimated since the 
equilibrium conditions constrain wholesale demand to 
be equal to the equilibrium retail quantity. The 
assumption that wholesale demand equals retail quantity 
implies a fixed-proportions production technology.
The direct impacts of the Dairy Price Support 
Program occur at the wholesale cheese and butter 
markets level. It is at this level that the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC) provides an alternative 
source of demand at announced purchase prices. In 
addition, cheese and butter can be stored as inventories, 
which represent another source of demand not present 
with the other two products. Consequently, the 
equilibrium conditions for the butter and cheese 
wholesale markets are different than those for the fluid 
milk and frozen wholesale markets. The wholesale 
cheese and butter markets have the following general 
specification:
(3.1) Qwd = Qr,
(3.2) Qws = f(PwISws),
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(3.3) Qws = Qwd + AINV + QSP s  Qw,
where: Qwd and Qws are wholesale demand and
supply, respectively, Pw is the wholesale own price, 
Sws is a vector of wholesale supply shifters including 
the Class III milk price, AINV is change in commercial 
inventories, QSP is quantity of product sold by specialty 
plants to the government, and Qw is the equilibrium 
wholesale quantity. The variables AINV and QSP 
represent a small proportion of total milk production
3
and are assumed to be exogenous in this model.
The Dairy Price Support Program is 
incorporated in the model by constraining the wholesale 
cheese and butter prices to be not less than their 
respective government purchase prices, i.e.:
(4.1) pwc > pgc
(4.2) Pwb > PSb,
where: Pgc and P8b are the government purchase
prices for cheese and butter, respectively.
Because of the Dairy Price Support Program,
four regimes are possible: (1) Pwc > Pgc and Pwb > 
pgb. (2) pwc > pgc and pwb = pgb. (3) pwc = pgc and 
pwb > pgb. or (4) pwc = pgc and pwb = pgb In the
cheese and butter markets, specific versions of 
equilibrium condition (3.3) are applicable to the first 
regime, which is the competitive case. In the second 
case, where the cheese market is competitive but the 
butter market is not, the wholesale butter price is set 
equal to the government purchase price for butter and 
the equilibrium condition is changed to:
(3.3b) Qwbs = Qwbd + AINVb + QSPb + Qgb s  Qwb,
where: Q8b is government purchases of butter which 
becomes the new endogenous variable, replacing the
 ^ Certain cheese and butter plants sell products to the government 
only, regardless of the relationship between the wholesale market 
price and the purchase price. These are general balancing plants that 
remove excess milk from the market when supply is greater than 
demand, and process the milk into cheese and butter which is then 
sold to the government. Because of this, the quantity of milk 
purchased by the government was disaggregated into purchases from 
these specialized plants and other purchases. In a competitive 
regime, the "other purchases" are expected to be zero, while the 
purchases from specialty plants may be positive. The QSPC and 
QSP), variables were determined by computing the average amount 
of government purchases of cheese and butter during competitive 
periods, i.e., when the wholesale price was greater than the purchase 
price for these two products.
wholesale butter price. For the third case, where the 
butter market is competitive, but the cheese market is 
not, the wholesale cheese price is set equal to the 
government purchase price for cheese and the 
equilibrium condition is changed to:
(3.3c) Qwcs = Qwcd + AINVC + QSPC + Q8C = Qwc,
where: QSC is government purchases of cheese which 
becomes the new endogenous variable, replacing the 
wholesale cheese price. Finally, for the last case where 
both the cheese and the butter markets are not 
competitive, the wholesale cheese and butter prices are 
set equal to their respective government purchase prices 
and the equilibrium conditions are changed to (3.3b) 
and (3.3c).
The farm raw milk market is represented by 
the following milk supply equation:
(5.1) Q fm  = f(E[Pfm]ISfm),
where: Qfm is commercial milk marketings in the
United States, E[pfm] is the expected farm milk price,
Sfm is a vector of milk supply shifters. As in the model 
developed by LaFrance and de Gorter (1985), and by 
Kaiser (1995), a perfect foresight specification is used 
for the expected farm milk price.
The farm milk price is a weighted average of 
the Class prices for milk, with the weights equal to the 
utilization of milk among products:
(5.2) Pfm =
Cpill + di » pwfs + pill * pwfzs + pill » qwcs + pill » Qwbs 
gwfs + qwfzs + qwcs + qwbs
where: P111 is the Class III price, d is the Class I fixed 
fluid milk differential (therefore the Class I price is 
equal to P111 + d), Qw s^ is wholesale fluid milk supply, 
qwfzs js wholesale frozen product supply, Q w cs is
^Because the market structure is different under each of these four 
regimes, using conventional two-stage least squares to estimate 
equations (1.1) through (4.2) may result in selectivity bias. 
Theoretically, a switching simultaneous system regression procedure 
should be applied, which is described in Liu, et al (1990, 1991). 
However, this procedure was not used here because it was beyond the 
scope of this project. Applying this procedure to the level of 
disaggregation of this model's manufactured product market would 
have been extremely cumbersome, and the costs of doing so were 
judged to be greater than the potential benefits.
6wholesale cheese supply, and Qwbs is wholesale butter 
supply.
Finally, the model is closed by the following 
equilibrium condition:
(5 .3) Qfm = Qwfs + Qwfzs + Qwcs + Qwbs + FUSE + OTHER,
where FUSE is on-farm use of milk and OTHER is milk 
used in dairy products other than fluid milk, frozen 
products, butter, and cheese. Both of these variables 
represented a small share of total milk production and 
were treated as exogenous.
The Econometric Results
The equations were estimated simultaneously using 
two-stage least squares and quarterly data from 1975 
through the third quarter of 1995. The econometric 
package used was Micro TSP. All equations in the 
model were specified in double-logarithm functional 
form. Estimation results are presented in Table 1 with t- 
values given in parentheses under each coefficient, and 
all variables and data sources are defined in Table 2. R2 
is the adjusted coefficient of determination, and DW is 
the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Table 1. Econometric results for the dairy industry model.
Retail Market
Retail Fluid Milk Demand:
In (Qrfd/POP) = - 2.543 - 0.117 In (Prf/Pbev) + 0.116 In (INC/ Pbev) - 0.069 In TREND - 0.014 DUMQ1- 0.061 DUMQ2 
(-14.81) (-2.00) (2.47) (-5.26) (-3.55 ) (-11.73)
- 0.055 DUMQ3 + 0.003 In DGFAD + 0.005 In DGFAD.] + 0.006 In DGFAD.2 + 0.005 In DGFAD.3 
(-14.03) (3.09) (3.09) (3.09) (3.09)
+ 0.003 In DGFAD-4 + 0.603 MA(1)
(3.09) (6.37)
R2 = 0.89; DW = 1.55 
Retail Frozen Demand:
In (Qrfzd/POP) = - 3.058 - 0.187 In (Prfz/Pro°) + 0.629 In (INC/ P'“j  - 0.00005 TREND2 + 0.079 DUMQ1 
(-11.24) (-0.64) (5.31) (-6.48) (5.24)
+ 0.318 DUMQ2 + 0.354 DUMQ3 
(21.10) (23.42)
R2 = 0.92; DW= 1.78
7Table 1. continued.
Retail Cheese Demand:
In (Qrcd/POP) = - 2.769 - 0.425 In (prc/pmea) + 0.286 In (INC/ Pmea) + 0.00006 TREND2 - 0.065 DUMQ1 
(-7.35) (-2.35) (1.97) (7.61) (-7.41)
- 0.031 DUMQ3 + 0.002 In DGCAD +.004 In DGCAD. i + 0.004 In DGCAD-2 + 0.004 In DGCAD.3
(-3.49) (1.69) (1.69) (1.69) (1.69)
+ 0.002 In DGCAD-4 + 0.362 AR(1)
(1.69) (2.66)
R2 = 0.96; DW = 1.90 
Retail Butter Demand:
In (Qrbd/POP) = - 2.386 - 0.510 In (Prb/Pfal) + 0.521 In (INC/Pfa') - 0.007 TREND - 0.189 DUMQ1 - 0.224 DUMQ2 
(-2.28) (-3.72) (1.24) (-1.90) (-6.24) (-7.44)
-0.129 DUMQ3 
(-4.27)
R2 = 0.47; DW = 1.88 
Retail Fluid Milk Supply:
In Qrfs = 0.844 + 0.060 In (Prf/Pwf) - 0.056 In (Pfe/Pwf) + 0.657 In Qrfs_i + 0.021 In TREND - 0.051 DUMQ1
(4.11) (0.74) (-2.97) (7.38) (3.62) (-8.58)
- 0.087 DUMQ2- 0.050 DUMQ3
(-17.63) (-13.66)
R2 = 0.95; DW = 2.31
Retail Frozen Products Supply:
In Qrfzs = 0.936 + 0.469 In (prfz/pwfz) + 0.072 DUMQ1 + 0.312 DUMQ2 + 0.351 DUMQ3 + 0.520 AR(1)
(60.61) (1.33) (5.43) (20.61) (26.12) (5.11)
R2 = 0.89; DW = 2.27
8Table 1. continued.
Retail Cheese Supply:
In Qrcs = 0.110 + 0.755 In (Prc/Pwc) - 0.317 In (plab/pwc). 0.392 In (Pfe/Pwc) + 0.318 In TREND - 0.070 DUMQ1 
(.212) (4.36) (-1.73) (-6.72) (11.97) (-7.86)
- 0.026 DUMQ3 + 0.435 AR(1)
(-3.03) (-3.63)
R2 = 0.97; DW = 2.03 
Retail Butter SupdIv:
In Qrbs = 0.393 + 0.356 In (prb/pwb). 0.047 In (Pfe/Pwb) - 0.200 DUMQ1 - 0.223 DUMQ2 - 0.127 DUMQ3
(1.50) (2.92) (-0.61) (-6.61) (-7.42) (-4.25)
R2 = 0.55; DW = 1.81
Wholesale Market
Wholesale Fluid Milk Supply;
In Qwfs = 0.374 + 0.078 In (Pwf/(Pm +d)) - 0.010 In (Pfe/P(Pm +d)) + 0.821 In Qwfs_i - 0.059 DUMQ1
(2.36) (2.00) (-1.09) (9.50) (-9.24)
- 0.094 DUMQ2 - 0.049 DUMQ3 - 0.292 AR(1)
(-20.79) (-11.12) (-2.36)
R2 = 0.95; DW = 2.21 
Wholesale Frozen Supply:
In Qwfzs = 0.560 + 0.173 In (pwfz/pIII) + 0.066 DUMQ1 + 0.305 DUMQ2 + 0.347 DUMQ3 + 0.408 AR(1)
(3.84) (2.60) (4.76) (19.45) (24.90) (3.70)
R2 = 0.90; DW = 2.17 
Wholesale Cheese Supply;
In Qwcs = 0.237 + 0.022 In (Pwc/Pm ) + 1.062 In (Qwcs)_i - 0.808 In (Qwcs)-2 + 0.709 In (Qwcs)-3 - 0.023 MDP
(.711) (.141) (14.62) (-9.83) (8.70) (-1.62)
- 0.017DTP - 0.144 DUMQ1 - 0.177 DUMQ3
(-1.25) (-10.05) (-14.37)
R2 = 0.98; DW = 2.21
9Table 1. continued.
Wholesale Butter SuddIv:
In Qwbs = 0.885 + 0.081 In (pwb/pIII) + 0.650 In Q’"*-l + 0.002 TREND - 0.076 DTP - 0.049 MDP + 0.079 DUMQ1
(5.42) (2.05) (8.14) (3.02) (-2.91) (-2.08) (3.51)
-0.145 DUMQ2 - 0.378 DUMQ3 
(-4.11) (-13.33)
R2 = 0.92; DW = 1.74
Farm Milk Market
Farm Milk Supply:
In Qfm = 1.254 + 0.076 In (pfm/pfeed). 0.040 ln (pcow/pfeed) + 0.585 ln gfm ^ . 0.390 ]n Qfm_2
(2.82) (1.98) (-1.80) (7.89) (-6.19)
+ 0.482 ln Qfm_3 - 0.030 DTP - 0.023 MDP + 0.063 DUMQ2 + 0.041 ln TREND 
(6.87) (-3.31) (-2.54) (11.41) (2.24)
R2 = 0.96; DW= 1.54
The retail market demand functions were 
estimated on a per capita basis. Retail demand for each 
product was specified to be a function of the following 
variables: 1) retail product price, 2) price of substitutes, 
3) per capita disposable income, 4) quarterly dummy 
variables to account for seasonal demand, 5) a time 
trend variable to capture changes in consumer tastes and 
preferences over time, and 6) generic advertising 
expenditures to measure the impact of advertising on 
retail demand. In all, demand functions, own prices, 
and income were deflated by a substitute product price 
index. The consumer price index for nonalcoholic 
beverages was used as the substitute price in the fluid 
milk demand equation, the consumer price index for 
meat was used as the substitute price in the cheese 
demand equation, the consumer price index for fat was 
used as the substitute price in the butter demand 
equation, and the consumer price index for food was 
used as the substitute price in the frozen product 
demand equations. To measure the advertising effort of 
the NDPRB, generic advertising expenditures for fluid 
milk and cheese were included as explanatory variables
in the two respective demand equations. Generic 
advertising expenditures for butter and frozen products 
were not included for two reasons. First, the NDPRB 
has not invested much money into advertising these two 
products. Second, including generic butter and frozen 
product advertising expenditures in an earlier version of 
the model resulted in highly statistically insignificant 
estimated coefficients.
To capture the dynamics of advertising, 
generic advertising expenditures were specified as a 
second-order polynomial distributed lag with both 
endpoint restrictions imposed. Based on previous 
research (e.g., Liu et al. (1991), Kaiser (1995)), a lag 
length of four quarters was chosen. Finally, a first- 
order moving average error structure was imposed on 
the retail fluid milk demand equation and a first-order 
autoregressive error structure was imposed on the retail 
cheese demand equation to correct for autocorrelation.
Based on the econometric estimation, generic 
fluid milk advertising had the largest long-run 
advertising elasticity (i.e., sum of current and lagged
^All generic advertising expenditures came from various issues of 
Leading National Advertisers.
Table 2. Variable definitions for the econometric model.
Endogenous Variables:
Qrfd = retail fluid milk demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent, 
prf = consumer retail price index for fresh milk and cream (1982-84 = 100),
Qrfzd _ retaii frozen dairy product demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
Prfz = consumer retail price index for frozen dairy products (1982-84 = 100),
Qrcd _ retail cheese demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
Prc = consumer retail price index for cheese (1982-84 = 100),
Qtbd _ retail butter demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
Prb = consumer retail price index for butter (1982-84 = 100),
Qtfs = retail fluid milk supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent, (Qr s^ = Qr^ ), 
pwf _ wholesale fluid milk price index (1982 = 100),
qrfzs _ retail frozen dairy product supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent, 
(Qrfzs = Qrfzd)
Pwfz = wholesale frozen dairy products price index (1982 = 100),
Qrcs = retail cheese supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
(Qrcs = Qrcd)i
pwc _ wholesale cheese price measured in cents/lb.,
Qrbs _ retail butter supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
(Qrbs = Qrbd)
pwb _ wholesale butter price measured in cents/lb.,
Q\vfs _ wholesale fluid milk supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
(Qwfs = Qrfs = Qrfd}i
pIH = Class III price for raw milk measured in $/cwt.,
Qwfzs _ wholesale frozen dairy product supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent, 
(Qwfzs = qrfzs _ Qrfzd)t
qwcs _ wholesale cheese supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
(Qwcs = Qrcs = Qrcd)
Qwbs _ wholesale butter supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
(Qwbs = Qrbs = Qrbd)
Qfm _ u  s  milk production measured in bil. lbs.,
Pfm = U.S. average all milk price measured in $/cwt.,
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Table 2. continued.
Exogenous Variables and Other Definitions:
POP = U.S. population measured in millions,
pbev _ Consumer retail price index for nonalcoholic beverages (1982-84 = 100),
INC = disposable personal income per capita, measured in thousand $,
TREND = time trend variable for the retail and wholesale-level equations, equal to 1 for 1975.1,....,
DUMQ1 = intercept dummy variable for first quarter of year,
DUMQ2 = intercept dummy variable for second quarter of year,
DUMQ3 = intercept dummy variable for third quarter of year,
DGFAD = generic fluid milk advertising expenditures deflated by the media price index, measured in thousand $, 
pfo° = Consumer retail price index for food (1982-84 = 100), 
pmea _ Consumer retail price index for meat (1982-84 = 100),
DGCAD = generic cheese advertising expenditures deflated by the media price index, measured in thousand $, 
pfe = Producer price index for fuel and energy (1967 = 100), 
plab _ average hourly wage in food manufacturing sector ($/hour), 
d = Class I fixed price differential for raw milk measured in $/cwt.,
MDP = intercept dummy variable for the Milk Diversion Program equal to 1 for 1984.1 through 1985.2; equal to 0 
otherwise,
DTP = intercept dummy variable for the Dairy Termination Program equal to 1 for 1986.2 through 1987.3; equal to 0 
otherwise,
pfeed _ u.S. average price per ton of 16 percent protein dairy feed, 
pcow _ u.S. average slaughter cow price measured in $/cwt.,
coefficients totaled), which was 0.021 and was
statistically different from zero at the 1 percent 
6
significance level. This means a 1 percent increase in 
generic fluid advertising expenditures resulted in a 
0.021 percent increase in fluid demand on average over 
this period. Generic cheese advertising was also 
positive and statistically significant from zero at the 1 
percent significance level and had a long run advertising 
elasticity of 0.016.
The retail supply for each product was 
estimated as a function of the following variables: 1) 
retail price, 2) wholesale price, which represents the
^These coefficients are partial advertising elasticities from the 
structural retail demand equations. They are not the total elasticities 
from the reduced-form price equations.
major variable cost to retailers, 3) producer price index 
for fuel and energy, 4) average hourly wage in the food 
manufacturing sector, 5) time trend variable, 6) 
quarterly dummy variables, and 7) lagged retail supply. 
The producer price index for fuel and energy was used 
as a proxy for variable energy costs, while the average 
hourly wage was used to capture labor costs in the retail 
supply functions. All prices and costs were deflated by 
the wholesale product price associated with each 
equation. The quarterly dummy variables were 
included to capture seasonality in retail supply, while 
the lagged supply variables were incorporated to 
represent capacity constraints. The time trend variable 
was included as a proxy for technological change in 
retailing. Not all of these variables remained in each of 
the final estimated retail supply equations due to 
statistical significance and/or wrong sign on the 
coefficient. Finally, a first-order moving average error
structure was imposed on the retail cheese and frozen 
product supply equations.
The wholesale supply for each product was 
estimated as a function of the following variables: 1) 
wholesale price, 2) the appropriate Class price for milk, 
which represents the main variable cost to wholesalers, 
3) producer price index for fuel and energy, 4) average 
hourly wage in the food manufacturing sector, 5) time 
trend variable, 6) quarterly dummy variables, 7) lagged 
wholesale supply, and 8) two dummy variables for the 
cheese and butter demand functions corresponding to 
the Milk Diversion Program and the Dairy Termination 
Program, which were two supply control programs 
implemented over some of this period. The producer 
price index for fuel and energy was included because 
energy costs are important variable costs to wholesalers, 
while the average hourly wage was used to capture 
labor costs in the wholesale supply functions. All prices 
and costs were deflated by the price of farm milk, i.e., 
Class price. The quarterly dummy variables were used 
to capture seasonality in wholesale supply, lagged 
wholesale supply was included to reflect capacity 
constraints, and the trend variable was incorporated as a 
measure of technological change in dairy product 
processing. Not all of these variables remained in each 
of the final estimated wholesale supply equations due to 
statistical significance and/or wrong sign on the 
coefficient. Finally, a first-order moving average error 
structure was imposed on the wholesale fluid milk and 
frozen product supply equations.
For the farm milk market, the farm milk supply 
was estimated as a function of the following variables: 
1) ratio of the farm milk price to feed price (16 percent 
protein content), 2) ratio of the price of slaughter cows 
to the feed price, 3) lagged milk supply, 4) intercept 
dummy variables to account for the quarters that the 
Milk Diversion and Dairy Termination Programs were 
in effect, 5) a dummy variable for the second quarter, 
and 6) time trend variable. The 16 percent protein feed 
price represents the most important variable costs in 
milk production, while the price of slaughtered cows 
represents an important opportunity cost to dairy 
farmers. Lagged milk supply was included as 
biological capacity constraints to current milk supply.
In terms of statistical fit, most of the estimated 
equations were found to be reasonable with respect to 
R2. In all but two equations, the adjusted coefficient of 
determination was above 0.88. The two equations that 
were the most difficult to estimate were the retail butter 
demand and supply equations. The retail butter demand 
and supply equations had the lowest R2 (0.47 and 0.55, 
respectively).
Validation of Dynamic Simulation Model
To validate the model, a dynamic in-sample simulation 
was performed from 1984.3 through 1995.3. This 
period was chosen because it corresponds to the time in 
which the national generic advertising program was in 
operation. The results should be judged in terms of how 
close the predicted endogenous variables are to their 
historic values. The dynamic simulation was conducted 
as follows. First, all exogenous variables were set equal 
to their historic levels for the simulation period. 
Second, all lagged dependent variables for the first 
simulation period (third quarter of 1984, denoted as 
1984.3) were set equal to their actual levels for the 
previous period (1984.2) and the system of equations 
[product specific versions of equations (1.1) through 
(4.2), as well as (5.5)] was solved simultaneously using 
the Newton method. Finally, the predicted endogenous 
variables became the lagged endogenous variables for 
the subsequent period. This process was repeated until 
the last period of the simulation (1995.3) was reached.
To measure how close each predicted 
endogenous variable was to its actual historical level, 
the Root Mean Square Percent Simulation error 
(RMSPSE) measure was computed, which is equal to 
the following formula:
n
RMSPSE ={(l/n) E ((YS, - YA,)/YA,))2r ,  
t=l
where: YS, is the simulated value of endogenous
variable Y, YA, is the actual historic value for 
endogenous variable Y, and n is the number of periods 
in the simulation.
Table 3 shows the RMSPSE for all of the 
endogenous variables in the model. Generally, the 
RMSPSEs for the supply and demand quantities were 
reasonable. All retail, wholesale, and farm supply and 
demand quantities had RMSPSEs under 5 percent. 
With respect to prices, the RMSPSEs tended to be 
slightly higher, ranging from a low of 3.5 percent for 
the farm milk price to a high of 9.8 percent for the 
wholesale butter price. Finally, the RMSPSEs for CCC 
cheese and butter purchases were 14.4 percent and 13.2 
percent, respectively. While this may appear high, the 
small magnitude of this variable was responsible, i.e., a 
small deviation from the actual value leads to a large 
RMSPSE. Based on these results, the model was 
deemed reasonable for simulation purposes.
Table 3. Root mean square percentage errors for the simulated endogenous variables.
Variable
Fluid demand/supply 
Frozen demand/supply 
Cheese demand 
Cheese supply 
Butter demand 
Butter supply 
Retail fluid price 
Retail frozen price 
Retail cheese price 
Retail butter price 
Wholesale fluid price 
Wholesale frozen price 
Wholesale cheese price 
Wholesale butter price 
Class III price 
Farm milk price 
CCC cheese purchases 
CCC butter purchases 
Milk supply
Root mean percentage 
________ square error
1.3
4.5 
4.9
4.6
2.5
4.2
3.6
5.5
4.8
4.2
4.6 
5.1
6.8
9.8
3.8 
3.5
14.4
13.2
1.7
Market Impacts of the NDPRB
To examine the impacts that the NDPRB had 
on the market over the period 1984.3-1995.3, the model 
was simulated under two scenarios based on generic 
advertising expenditures: 1) historic scenario, where
advertising levels were equal to actual generic 
advertising expenditures, and 2) no NDPRB scenario, 
where quarterly values of generic advertising 
expenditures were equal to quarterly levels for the year 
prior to the adoption of the NDPRB, i.e., 1983.3­
1984.2. A comparison of these two scenarios provides 
a measure of the impacts of the NDPRB on the dairy 
markets. Table 4 presents the quarterly averages of 
price and quantity variables for two time periods: 1) 
1984.3-95.3, and 2) 1994.3-95.3. The last two columns
in the table give the percentage change in each variable 
due to the NDPRB respectively for the life of the 
program and the most recent year. The results for the 
longer time period are discussed first.
It is clear from these results that the NDPRB 
had an impact on the dairy market for the period 
1984.3-95.3. For example, the generic advertising 
effort of the NDPRB resulted in a 0.91 percent increase 
in fluid sales and a 5.62 percent increase in retail fluid 
price compared to what would have occurred in the 
absence of this national program. The increase in fluid 
sales also caused the wholesale fluid price to increase 
by 4.10 percent. The increase in advertising 
expenditures due to the NDPRB also had positive 
impacts on the retail cheese market. Retail cheese
quantity and price were 0.48 percent and 0.81 percent 
higher, respectively. The increase in cheese sales caused 
the wholesale cheese price to rise by 2.75 percent.
Although generic butter and frozen product 
advertising were not included in the retail demand 
equations, generic fluid and cheese advertising by the 
NDPRB had some indirect, but minor impacts on butter 
and frozen product markets. For example, the retail and 
wholesale frozen product price increased, on average, 
by 0.73 percent and 1.07 percent, respectively, due to 
the NDPRB advertising effort. The increase in frozen 
product prices were primarily due to the higher Class III 
milk price manufacturers had to pay under the NDPRB 
advertising scenario. Advertising by the NDPRB had 
little impact on retail and wholesale butter prices, but 
butter supply declined by 0.39 percent under NDPRB 
advertising. The decline in butter supply was due to a 
higher average Class III price.
The NDPRB also had an impact on purchases 
of cheese and butter by the government. The modest 
increase in cheese demand relative to the increase in 
wholesale supply due to NDPRB advertising caused 
cheese purchases by the government to fall by 12 
percent, on average, over this period. Likewise, while 
butter demand did not change, the 0.39 percent decrease 
in butter supply due to generic advertising by the 
NDPRB caused butter purchases by the government to 
decrease by 1.59 percent over the period. Total dairy 
product purchases by the government were 2.01 percent 
lower in the NDPRB scenario.
The introduction of the NDPRB also had an 
impact on the farm market over the previous 11 years. 
The Class III and farm milk prices increased by 2.03 
percent and 1.93 percent under the national program 
due to an increase of 0.51 percent in total milk demand. 
Farm supply, in turn, increased by 0.40 percent. 
Farmers were better off under the NDPRB since 
producer surplus averaged 2.34 percent higher with the 
program. One measure of the net benefits of the 
NDPRB to farmers is the rate of return, which gives the 
ratio of benefits to costs of the national program. 
Specifically, this rate of return measure was calculated 
as the change in producer surplus, due to the NDPRB, 
divided by the costs of funding this program. The cost 
of the program was measured as the 15 cents per 
hundredweight assessment times total milk marketings. 
In the year prior to the program, farmers voluntarily 
contributed 6.3 cents per hundredweight. Therefore, the 
difference in cost due to the national checkoff was 
assumed to be the difference between 0.0015 times milk 
marketings (in billion pounds) under the NDPRB 
scenario minus 0.00063 times milk marketings in the 
no-NDPRB scenario. The results showed that the rate
of return from the NDPRB was 3.40 over the 11 year 
period. This means that an additional dollar invested in 
generic advertising would return $3.40 in producer 
surplus to farmers. The farm level rate of return was 
lower than estimates of 4.77 by Liu et al. (1990) for the 
period 1975.1 through 1987.4, 4.60 by Kaiser and 
Forker (1993) for the period 1975.1 through 1990.4, 
and 5.40 for the period 1975.1 through 1993.4 by 
Kaiser (1995).
The last column in Table 4 gives the most 
recent year impacts of the NDPRB. In general, the most 
recent year results demonstrate larger market impacts of 
the NDPRB advertising effort than the 11 year average. 
For example, generic advertising by the NDPRB in the 
last four quarters resulted in a 1.72 percent increase in 
fluid sales and a 10.11 percent increase in retail fluid 
price relative to what would have occurred without 
NDPRB advertising. The increase in fluid sales caused 
the wholesale fluid price to increase by 6.74 percent, on 
average, over the last year in the simulation. One 
..reason for larger NDPRB advertising impacts on the 
fluid market in the recent period is due to greater 
emphasis on fluid advertising in recent years
While the advertising effort of the NDPRB in 
the last year continued to have a positive impact on the 
cheese market, the magnitude of impacts were smaller 
than overall average for the 11 year period. Again, this 
was due to the increase in fluid milk advertising and 
decrease in cheese advertising in recent years. Retail 
cheese sales and price were 0.27 percent and 0.49 
percent higher, respectively, due to NDPRB advertising. 
The modest increase in cheese sales resulted in an 
average increase of 1.78 percent in the wholesale cheese 
price as well.
The most recent year’s advertising impacts on 
government purchases were smaller than the 11 year 
average because purchases were at much smaller levels 
to begin with. For example, purchases of cheese by the 
government were predicted to be zero both with and 
without NDPRB advertising. Butter purchases, 
however, were 2.25 percent lower with advertising.
The farm market impacts due to the NDPRB 
were larger in the most recent year than the 11 year 
period. The Class III and farm milk price increased by 
3.04 percent and 2.93 percent, respectively, on average 
for the past year due to the national program. This was 
due to an increase in total milk demand of 0.70 percent 
because of generic advertising. Farm supply, in turn, 
was 0.62 percent higher in the NDPRB scenario. 
Farmers were better off under the NDPRB since 
producer surplus was 3.52 percent higher, and the rate 
of return was 6.43. Note that the rate of return was
Table 4. Simulated quarterly values for market variables with and without NDPRB, averaged over 1984.3­
95.3, and over 1994.3-95.3.
________ 1984.3-95.3 Average________ 1994.3-95.3 Average
Variable Unit
with
NDPRB
without
NDPRB
Percent
change
Percent
change
Fluid demand/supply bil lbs me 13.59 13.47 0.91 1.72
Frozen demand/supply bil lbs me 3.16 3.16 -0.16 -0.24
Cheese demand bil lbs me 12.26 12.20 0.48 0.27
Cheese supply bil lbs me 12.31 12.26 0.42 0.27
Butter demand bil lbs me 5.24 5.24 -0.06 -0.21
Butter supply bil lbs me 6.65 6.67 -0.39 -0.47
Total demand bil lbs me 34.25 34.07 0.51 0.70
Retail fluid price 1982-84=100 114.94 108.47 5.62 10.11
Retail frozen price 1982-84=100 130.11 129.16 0.73 1.10
Retail cheese price 1982-84=100 123.38 122.38 0.81 0.49
Retail butter price 1982-84=100 95.41 95.31 0.10 0.39
Wholesale fluid price 1982=100 124.94 119.82 4.10 6.74
Wholesale frozen price 1982=100 126.59 125.23 1.07 1.62
Wholesale cheese price $/lb 2.46 2.40 2.75 1.78
Wholesale butter price $/lb 1.10 1.09 0.27 1.12
Class III price $/cwt 12.65 12.39 2.03 3.04
All milk price $/cwt 13.60 13.34 1.93 2.93
CCC cheese purchases bil lbs me 0.06 0.07 -12.00 0.00
CCC butter purchases bil lbs me 1.42 1.44 -1.59 -2.25
CCC purchases bil lbs me 1.48 1.51 -2.01 -2.25
Milk supply bil lbs 36.52 36.38 0.40 0.62
Producer surplus bil $ 4.63 4.52 2.34 3.52
almost twice as high for the most recent year than it 
was, on average, for the past 11 years. Therefore, the 
results suggest that the net benefits of the NDPRB to 
farmers have become larger in recent years.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impacts of 
generic dairy advertising by the National Dairy 
Promotion and Research Board on retail, wholesale, and 
farm dairy markets. A disaggregated industry model of 
the retail, wholesale, and farm levels with markets for 
fluid milk, frozen products, cheese, and butter was 
developed to conduct the analysis. An econometric 
model of the dairy industry was estimated using 
quarterly data from 1975 through 1995. The 
econometric results were then used to simulate market 
conditions with and without the NDPRB.
The results indicated that the NDPRB had a 
major impact on market conditions. Over the life of the 
national program, the NDPRB had an impact on fluid 
and cheese markets, government purchases under the 
Dairy Price Support Program, and farm markets. 
Selected findings averaged over the period 1984.3-95.3 
include: 0.91 percent increase in fluid sales, 0.48
percent increase in cheese sales, 0.51 percent increase in 
total milk demand, 5.62 percent increase in retail fluid 
milk price, 0.81 percent increase in retail cheese price, 
4.10 percent increase in wholesale fluid price, 2.75 
percent increase in wholesale cheese price, 2.03 percent 
increase in Class III price, 1.93 percent increase in farm 
milk price, 2.01 percent decrease in government 
purchases of dairy products, 0.40 percent increase in 
milk supply, and 3.34 percent increase in dairy producer 
surplus compared to what would have occurred without 
NDPRB advertising. The rate of return to NDPRB 
advertising for the 11 year period was 3.36. More 
recent findings average over the last year include: 1.72
percent increase in fluid sales, 0.27 percent increase in 
cheese sales, 0.70 percent increase in total milk demand, 
10.11 percent increase in retail fluid milk price, 0.49 
percent increase in retail cheese price, 6.74 percent 
increase in wholesale fluid price, 1.78 percent increase 
in wholesale cheese price, 3.04 percent increase in Class 
III price, 2.93 percent increase in farm milk price, 2.25 
percent decrease in government purchases of dairy 
products, 0.62 percent increase in milk supply, and 6.43 
percent increase in dairy producer surplus compared to 
what would have occurred without NDPRB advertising. 
Therefore, the results suggest the net benefits to farmers 
have become larger in recent years.
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